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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most pervasive cultural events of the last half of the
twentieth century has been a change in the composition of the American
family unit. As a direct result of both the number and the social
acceptance of divorces and illegitimate births, the number of children
being raised in single parent households or in households including a
remarried parent and half or step siblings has greatly increased. In
addition to the social and psychological effects on the children involved,
this phenomenon also has had an undeniable economic impact. Empirical
studies indicate that divorce often means economic devastation because
the income that previously maintained one intact family in a single
household must now be divided to provide for the maintenance of the
non-custodial or non-domiciliary parent' in his2 own home and for the
custodial or domiciliary parent and their children in another home.
Three important factors that have contributed to the adverse eco-
nomic consequences of divorce are the inconsistency in the amounts of
child support awards,3 the frequent inadequacy of the award amounts, 4
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1. In Louisiana, joint custody is presumed to be in the best interest of the child
(La. Civ. Code art. 146) and is the preferred custodial arrangement following a divorce
of the child's parents. Under the state's new child support guidelines, support payments
may be enforced against a non-custodial parent or against a parent who has legal joint
custody but is not the parent with whom the child usually resides. Therefore, in this
article, the terms "non-domiciliary parent" and "non-custodial parent" will be used
synonymously to refer to the parent obligated to pay child support, whether the child is
in the sole legal custody of one parent or in the legal joint custody of both parents but
living primarily in the domicile of the obligee parent. Likewise, the terms "custodial
parent" and "domiciliary parent" will be used synonymously to refer to the parent
receiving child support payments on behalf of his or her minor child, whether the obligee
parent has sole or joint legal custody of the child.
2. The father is the non-custodial parent approximately 90% of the time. Goldfarb,
Child Support Guidelines: A Model for Fair Allocation of Child Care, Medical, and
Educational Expenses, 21 Fain. L.Q. 325, 331 (1987) [hereinafter Goldfarb].
3. See, e.g., Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Support Orders, 21
Fain. L.Q. 281, 285 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, Guidelines] (a study of child support
awards in the Denver District Court showed a single judge ordering payments for the
support of one child ranging from 6%0 to 33% of parental income and payment for the
support of two children ranging from 5.6% to 40% of parental income).
4. Informal studies in limited geographical areas have indicated that the implemen-
tation of child support guidelines caused an increase in awards by approximately 30% to
50%. Williams, Deficiencies in Child Support: Consequences for Children and Implications
for Courts, State Ct. J., Fall 1988, at 4 [hereinafter Williams, Deficiencies].
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and the failure to effectively enforce child support judgments. Congress
evidenced its concern with these factors in the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984,' which encouraged the states to pursue stronger
enforcement strategies and to develop child support guidelines.
The importance of child support guidelines as an appropriate solution
to the problems of inconsistency and inadequacy of child support awards
was reiterated when Congress made such guidelines mandatory in all
states through the enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988.6 In
response to that Congressional mandate, Louisiana was forced to either
enact a feasible and presumptively correct 7 schedule of child support
guidelines to be utilized by all of its courts hearing child support cases
or risk losing millions of dollars in federal funding through public
assistance programs.8 Substantive guidelines were enacted and became
effective on October 1, 1989.9
This article will evaluate the theoretical model upon which the Louis-
iana child support guidelines are based and examine the various pro-
visions of the new legislation. The procedure to be used in determining
child support awards under the guidelines will be explained and problems
likely to be encountered in interpreting the guidelines will be explored.
It is hoped that this analysis will be of assistance to family law prac-
titioners, judges, and parents seeking a more thorough understanding
of the new legislation.
II. THEORETICAL MODELS FOR DETERMINING PROPER CHILD SUPPORT
PAYMENTS
The Family Support Act of 1988 granted the states unlimited au-
thority to devise their own child support guidelines. Researchers, how-
ever, have only developed a few models of systematic philosophical
approaches to be used in determining the proper amount of support
that also address the targeted problems and can, therefore, be offered
as viable alternatives to the traditional rule of wide judicial discretion
in the determination of child support amounts. These models provide
the basic philosophy underlying the guidelines.
Louisiana adopted guidelines based on the income shares model.
This model is more compatible with Louisiana's public policies regarding
5. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 18(a),
98 Stat. 1305, 1321-22 (1984).
6. The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
7. Id. at § 103.
8. Mingo, Child Support Law to Change Effective Oct. 1, Louisiana Woman, Aug.
1989, at 3.
9. 1989 La. Acts No. 9, 2d Extraordinary Sess. (codified as amended at La. R.S.
9:315-315.14 (Supp. 1990)) [hereinafter the Act].
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a parent's child support obligations than are the cost sharing method
and the income equalization method, the two other models most often
proposed by researchers.10 A brief comparison of these three models
will introduce the policy considerations and the theoretical methodology
upon which the Louisiana child support guidelines are based.
A. The Cost Sharing Model
The cost sharing model is based on the premise that a non-domiciliary
parent should share with the domiciliary parent only the actual expenses
incurred in raising their children." This runs counter to the policy
expressed in the Louisiana Civil Code that "[e]ach parent shall be
responsible for child support based on the needs of the child and the
actual resources of each parent.' ' 2 To facilitate this policy and in an
effort to preserve as nearly as possible the financial status quo of the
intact family even after the family's break-up, Louisiana jurisprudence
has concluded that a parent's obligation to support his or her minor
children must go beyond the mere subsistence level needs of the children
and encompass the sharing of the non-domiciliary parent's lifestyle with
the children. 3 The cost sharing method would be inappropriate for use
in Louisiana because of the policy that has guided the determination
of child support awards in the past. Cost sharing takes into account
only the actual financial needs of the children and ignores the added
benefits available to the children, through the consideration of the
resources and lifestyle of the non-domiciliary parent, that would auto-
matically have been available to the children had their parents remained
married to each other.
B. The Income Equalization Model
Compared to the cost sharing model, the income equalization model
comes closer to meeting the goal of sharing the parents' standard of
10. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 328-30; Williams, Guidelines, supra note 3,
at 290-304; Brackney, Battling Inconsistency and Inadequacy: Child Support Guidelines
in the States, 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 197, 201 (1988) [hereinafter Brackney]. Two other
methods which have enjoyed limited application are the straight percentage of income
formula utilized for several years in Wisconsin (and previously applied by the Louisiana
Department of Health and Human Resources) and the Melson Formula, a combination
of the cost sharing and income sharing models, which is used in Delaware.
11. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 329.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 146 (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Ducote v. Ducote, 339 So. 2d 835, 838 (La. 1976); Updegraff v.
Updegraff, 421 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Dickinson v. Dickinson, 461
So. 2d 1184, 1186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 465 So. 2d 736 (1985); Garcia
v. Garcia, 438 So. 2d 256, 258 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Hogan v. Hogan, 465 So. 2d
73, 77 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 468 So. 2d 120 (1985).
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living with their minor children. In a deliberate attempt to insure that
the custodial and non-custodial households share the same standard of
living,1 4 the financial burden of supporting two households is shared by
all family members. 5 The financial resources of former spouses (and
their current spouses, if any) are added together and then apportioned
among the members of the two households on a per person basis.
This method, however, is incompatible with Louisiana's policy re-
garding alimentary obligations due persons other than minor children.
Louisiana requires that support for a parent's minor children be at a
level above mere subsistence, in accordance with the non-custodial par-
ent's ability to pay child support and in keeping with the lifestyle that
the parent's income permits. But our legislature has not endorsed such
a high level of support for either former spouses or other family members
above the age of majority. Instead, alimony is to be paid to a former
spouse only when the obligee has been found to be without fault in
the divorce proceeding and does not independently have sufficient means
for his or her own support.16 Any obligation to pay alimony to a former
spouse ends when the obligee remarries or enters a relationship in which
he or she lives with a domestic partner short of marriage. 7 A ceiling
on the amount of spousal alimony is set at one-third of the obligor's
income," while no such cap has ever been set with regard to a parent's
financial obligation for his or her minor children. The alimentary ob-
ligation owed to family members other than one's minor children is a
reciprocal obligation existing only between direct ascendants and de-
scendants. The obligee must be proven incapable of providing for his
or her own support and the obligor can be required to provide only
the basic necessities of life.' 9 Obviously, Louisiana's interest in assuring
that a parent provide financial support to his or her minor children is
significantly greater than its interest in seeing that former spouses or
adult family members are well provided for.
Furthermore, while Louisiana courts have held that the income of
a stepparent may be considered in determining the amount of a child
14. Brackney, supra note 10, at 201.
15. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 328.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 160.
17. Id. The termination of permanent alimony upon a finding of open concubinage
by the obligee spouse is discussed in Gray v. Gray, 451 So. 2d 579 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 457 So. 2d 13 (1984); Thomas v. Thomas, 440 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 443 So. 2d 597 (1983); and Cook v. Cook, 436 So. 2d 743 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1983). For jurisprudential recognition of the termination of alimony upon the
remarriage of the obligee spouse, see, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 308 So. 2d 379, 381 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), amended, 321 So. 2d 318 (1975), modified on other grounds; and McConnell
v. McConnell, 295 So. 2d 60, 63 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 296 So. 2d 834 (1974).
18. La. Civ. Code art. 160.
19. La. Civ. Code art. 229.
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support award, 20 stepparents in this state are not personally obligated
to provide financial support for the children of their spouses. 21 Thus,
use of the income equalization model, which apportions each parent's
income equally among children, former spouses, new spouses, and chil-
dren of the former spouses would clearly be contrary to the public
policy of Louisiana because it would ignore Louisiana's scheme of
providing different levels of support for minor children, former spouses,
and other alimentary obligees and would require, in all cases, that
stepparents support the children of their spouses.
C. The Income Shares Model
The guidelines adopted by Louisiana are based on the income shares
model.22 The major principles of this model are that the amount of
money required for the support of a minor child is greater than the
total cost of the child's subsistence level needs, that the required amount
is dependant upon the income of the child's parents, and that each
parent should contribute toward his or her child's financial support in
proportion to that parent's income. These principles are identical to
those forming the foundation of Louisiana's child support philosophy
prior to the enactment of the new guidelines, 23 with the added benefit
that this model includes a numerical schedule of child support awards
designed to eliminate, in the theoretical sense at least, the extent of
judicial discretion used in selecting a specific dollar amount to be awarded
the domiciliary parent for application toward the support of the minor
child.
To determine the level of support, the income of each parent is
added to that of the other to determine their combined income. A
columnar schedule is then consulted. This schedule, based on the number
of children involved, provides the presumptive total amount of money
20. See, e.g., Marcus v. Burnett, 282 So. 2d 122, 124 (La. 1973); Finley v. Finley,
305 So. 2d 654, 657 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Culpepper v. Culpepper, 514 So. 2d 701,
703 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Phillips v. Phillips, 319 So. 2d 566, 567 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975). But see Barnes v. Rosen, 359 So. 2d 1133 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
362 So. 2d 1120 (1978), and Alt v. Alt, 433 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
21. The policy regarding the possible inclusion of a stepparent's income in the cal-
culation of a child support award is perpetuated under the new guidelines and is codified
at La. R.S. 9:315(6)(c) (Supp. 1990). For a more thorough discussion of a stepparent's
financial responsibility toward his or her spouse's children, see also Riley, Stepparents'
Responsibility of Support, 44 La. L. Rev. 1753 (1984) [hereinafter Riley].
22. This method was originally designed by the Institute for Court Management of
the National Center for State Courts under the Child Support Guidelines Project. Williams,
Guidelines, supra note 3, at 291.
23. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 146, 227.
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proper24 for the support of the couple's children at the couple's income
level. The total support amount is then multiplied by the percentage of
income contributed by each parent. The domiciliary parent is expected
to spend his or her proportionate share of the total support amount
on the children each month while the non-domiciliary parent must pay
his or her proportionate share to the domiciliary parent in satisfaction
of a money judgment. This concept is in accord with Louisiana's policy
that both parents are, consistent with their ability to pay, 2 responsible
for the support, maintenance, and education of their children and that
this obligation arises from the very act of marriage. 26
An example may help to illustrate both the methodology employed
under this theory and the ease with which the amount of the child
support award can be determined in an uncomplicated scenario. 27 Sup-
pose the non-domiciliary parent's gross income is $2,000 per month and
the domiciliary parent's gross income is $1,000 per month. Their total
monthly income is thus $3,000. If they have two minor children, the
basic child support obligation, according to the schedule enacted by the
Louisiana legislature, 2s is $716. Since the non-domiciliary parent earns
24. "There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of child support
obtained by use of the guidelines set forth in this Part is the proper amount of child
support." La. R.S. 9:315.1.A (Supp. 1990). It would be inaccurate to say that the number
derived from utilizing this method is the amount of money the legislature has determined
to be necessary for the support of the child involved. The use of a schedule such as the
one found at La. R.S. 9:315.14 (Supp. 1990) to derive the "proper amount of child
support" hides the policy decision as to what percentage of a family's total income is
to be spent on each child. An examination of the Louisiana schedule, however, reveals
that as income increases, the percentage of total income which is "proper" to be spent
on the children decreases. The schedule also fails to reveal the fact that the child support
formula assures that the "proper amount of child support" leaves the obligor parent with
an income adequate for his own subsistence. The existence of the parental subsistence
allowance is revealed in R. Williams, Child Support Guidelines Briefing Material (February
1, 1989) [hereinafter Briefing Material 1] and R. Williams, Child Support Guidelines
Briefing Material (May 23, 1989) [hereinafter Briefing Material 2].
25. La. Civ. Code art. 146. Marcus v. Burnett, 282 So. 2d 122 (La. 1973).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 227. Despite the express statutory statement that the source
of the obligation to support one's children arises from the marriage contract, Louisiana
jurisprudence also maintains that the obligation arises not from marriage but from the
act of parenthood. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 404 So. 2d 1230, 1233 (La. 1981); Pierce
v. Pierce, 397 So. 2d 62, 64 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Clement v. Clement, 506 So. 2d
624, 626 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 480 So. 2d 1031, 1033 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1985); Lacassagne v. Lacassagne, 430 So. 2d 818, 820 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1983).
27. La. R.S. 9:315.2 (Supp. 1990), entitled "Calculation of basic child support ob-
ligation," describes the basic process to be used under the guidelines in deriving the
amount of the child support award. There is also a worksheet provided in La. R.S.
9:315.15 (Supp. 1990) to facilitate the procedure.
28. The schedule of basic child support obligations can be found at La. R.S. 9:315.14
(Supp. 1990).
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two-thirds of the total income, he will be ordered by the court to pay
two-thirds of $716, or $477, to the domiciliary parent each month. The
domiciliary parent's one-third share of the total child support amount,
$239, is expected to be spent on the children, but no order will issue
requiring that result.2 9
The income shares model creates an inherent inequity, which is
reflected in the new Louisiana guidelines, in that only one of the parents
is subject to an enforceable child support judgment despite the Louisiana
public policy that both parents are responsible for the support of their
children. An obligor parent who fails to make child support payments
is subject to a contempt citation, garnishment of wages, and possible
imprisonment. The obligee parent, however, has only the theoretical
responsibility to spend actual dollars in support of the minor children.
There is no requirement that the obligee parent account for either the
obligee's proportionate share of the total monthly child support obli-
gation or for the use of the child support payment received from the
obligor parent. The only recourse for an obligor parent who believes
that the custodial parent is not properly discharging the financial re-
sponsibility to the children is to file criminal charges for neglect3 ° or
to sue for a change in the custody arrangement.3
The Louisiana legislature deleted from the new guidelines language
3 2
creating a presumption that the custodial parent would spend the proper
amount of money directly on the financial needs of the children. At-
tempts to amend the guidelines to provide for an accounting by the
custodial parent of amounts actually spent on the children were also
unsuccessful because the amendments were perceived to be administra-
tively unwieldy. 33 Unfortunately, such reasoning ignores the practical
inequity to the obligor parent 34 as well as the divergence of this rule
from Louisiana's policy regarding the responsibility of both parents for
the financial support of their children.
29. La. R.S. 9:315.8.D (Supp. 1990).
30. La. R.S. 14:74 (Supp. 1990).
31. Simon v. Calvert, 289 So. 2d 567, 570 (La. App. 3d Cir.), application denied,
293 So. 2d 187 (1974).
32. See, House Committee Amendments, Proposed by Committee on Civil Law and
Procedure for the Louisiana House of Representatives to H.R. 18, 15th La. Leg. 2d
Extraordinary Sess. (1989).
33. State-Times (Baton Rouge, Louisiana), July 10, 1989, at 4A, col. 4.
34. Child support guidelines which have resulted in significantly larger awards than
those traditionally set have been criticized as "really a form of disguised maintenance
[which] . . . may be used for the benefit of the custodial spouse rather than the children."
Pontius, Minnesota's Child Support Guidelines: Toward A Fair and Rational Standard
for Child Support, 9 Hamline L. Rev. 459, 493 (1986) [hereinafter Pontius]. This perception
was mirrored in State v. Hall, 418 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), which held that
it is inappropriate to use child support to upgrade the standard of living of custodial
parents.
1990]
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Proponents of the position that the custodial parent should not be
forced to account but should instead be presumptively considered to
spend his or her proportionate share of the total child support obligation
on the children maintain that a custodial parent provides non-monetary
services to the children35 in the form of nurturing, nursing, help with
homework, car pooling, and the like that are not factored into the child
support guidelines and are, therefore, not shared by the non-custodial
parent. It has been suggested that the provision of such services to the
children may in fact impede the earning capacity of custodial parents
whose disposable time and energies could be spent on their careers but
is instead directed toward raising their children.3 6
These are very real concerns, but the proper forum for addressing
them would be in the confection of the actual schedule of basic child
support obligations or the methodology to be used in applying that
schedule.37 The concerns should not be used to justify a custodial parent's
failure to spend the judicially determined amount of money on the
children or to relieve the custodial parent of the duty to account to the
non-custodial parent for the use of his or her contributions to their
children's welfare. Recognition of the custodial parent's non-monetary
contributions must be balanced against the provision in the guidelines
that requires the non-custodial parent to satisfy the child support judg-
ment strictly in monetary terms, the rendering of goods or services not
being recognized by the new guidelines as an appropriate means of
discharging the judgment.38 Should it be determined that the custodial
parent's non-monetary support of the children should be shared by both
35. See, e.g., Elrod, Kansas Child Support Guidelines: An Elusive Search for Fairness
in Support Orders, 27 Washburn L.J. 104, 127 (1987) [hereinafter Elrod]; Pontius, supra
note 34, at 480; Bruch, Developing Standards for Child Support Payments: A Critique
of Current Practice, 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 49, 54 [hereinafter Bruch]; Bruch & Wikler,
The Economic Consequences, Juv. & Fam. Ct. J., Fall 1985, at 5, 24; Douglas, Factors
in Determining Child Support, Juv. & Fam. Ct. J., Fall 1985, at 27, 28 [hereinafter
Douglas]. Louisiana jurisprudence has also held that non-monetary contributions made to
the support of the children should be considered when the amount of a child support
order is fixed. See, e.g., Seal v. Bell, 464 So. 2d 1026 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Miller
v. Miller, 475 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); Brinks v. Brinks, 483 So. 2d 1307
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
36. This is sometimes referred to as the "opportunity cost" or the "lost opportunity
cost." Giampetro, Mathematical Approaches to Calculating Child Support Payments:
Stated Objectives, Practical Results, and Hidden Policies, 20 Fam. L.Q. 373, 381 (1986);
Pontius, supra note 34, at 493.
37. Perhaps the custodial parent's proportionate share of the basic child support
obligation could, for example, be reduced by a fair percentage to compensate for non-
monetary contributions and possible lost earnings rather than being based strictly orf his
or her proportionate contribution to the total gross income of the parents.
38. The recognition of child support payments as the only means of satisfying a child
support judgment is not a change in the law of Louisiana. See, e.g., Blankenship v.
[Vol. 501064
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parents through a proportionate reimbursement in the form of increased
child support payments, it should also be recognized that a non-custodial
parent might make non-monetary contributions to the welfare of the
children and that these should also be factored into the child support
calculation and shared by the parents. It hardly seems reasonable that
two different standards should apply simply because one of the parents
lives with the children and the other parent does not, it being impossible
for the children to be domiciled in two places at once.
III. ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA's GUIDELINES
Although the income shares model is largely compatible with Louis-
iana's public policy regarding a parent's child support obligation and
its methodology can often be employed with ease, the provisions of the
Act that implement the model illustrate the difficulty in drafting a
comprehensive set of child support guidelines that takes into consider-
ation all conceivable concerns, 9 solves all related problems, and is free
from interpretational difficulties. It is important, therefore, that the
specific provisions of Louisiana's guidelines be critically analyzed.
Blankenship, 382 So. 2d 982, 983 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Powell v. Barsavage, 399
So. 2d 1308, 1312 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981). The new guidelines do provide for direct
payments to providers of four types of services: work-related net child care costs, health
insurance premiums, extraordinary medical expenses, or other extraordinary expenses. None
of these services, however, are factored into the basic child support obligation; instead,
each is a category of services which may be added to the basic child support obligation
upon order of the court. La. R.S. 9:315.3-315.6, 9:315.8.D (Supp. 1990).
39. Several items considered by other jurisdictions in the confection of child support
guidelines were not addressed by the Louisiana legislation. Among these is the question
of whether parents have a duty to provide a college education for their children. Cases
in Louisiana have been decided both ways and the new guidelines ignore this issue. See,
e.g., Pettitt v. Pettitt, 261 So. 2d 687, 689 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972) (holding that the
obligation to educate one's children includes providing a college education). But see, e.g.,
Phillips v. Phillips, 339 So. 2d 1299, 1301 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Dubroc v. Dubroc,
284 So. 2d 869, 870 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Jordan v. Jordan, 432 So. 2d 314, 318
(La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 438 So. 2d 1111 (1983) (holding that the obligation to
educate one's children ends when the child reaches the age of majority). Some states are
currently attempting to solve the problems which can arise upon the death of a non-
custodial parent. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 35, at 30. There has been debate in other
jurisdictions regarding the appropriateness of extending a parent's financial obligation to
his or her children beyond their minority. For a discussion of the subject of postminority
support, see Elrod, supra note 35, at 140. Notably absent in Louisiana's formula for the
calculation of child support awards is a consideration of the child's age. The guidelines
used in the state of Washington, for example, allow for increases in child support payments
as children get older. Thompson and Paikin, Formulas and Guidelines for Support, Juv.
& Fain. Ct. J., Fall 1985, at 33, 35 [hereinafter Thompson & Paikin]. For more discussion
of the need to increase support payments as children get older, see also Bruch, supra
note 35, at 52; Williams, Guidelines, supra note 3, at 314.
19901 1065
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
A. Calculation of a Party's Income Under the Guidelines
1. Defining Gross Income
The combined "gross income" of both parents is, under the guide-
lines, the primary indicator of the amount of the child support award.
"Gross income" is defined broadly to include
[t]he income from any source, including but not limited to
salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, dividends, severance pay,
pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, capital gains, social
security benefits, worker's compensation benefits, unemployment
insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, gifts, prizes, and
spousal support received from a preexisting spousal support
obligation. 40
Gross income also includes reductions to living expenses such as a
company car or reimbursed meals as well as "[g]ross receipts minus
ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce income" if the
parent is self-employed. 4' Child support received and benefits from public
assistance programs, however, are not to be included in the gross income
calculation. 42
a. Gifts and Prizes
One question that arises from the above definition of gross income
concerns the propriety of including gifts and prizes in a parent's gross
income. It is unclear whether the legislative intent was to include in
gross income only monetary gifts and prizes or if the value of non-
monetary gifts and prizes were also to be included. It seems inequitable
that the number of real dollars a parent is required to spend on his or
her children should be increased when his or her income has not been
enhanced in real dollars. For a domiciliary parent, this provision could
be quite damaging. When, for example, a domiciliary parent receives
clothing as a gift in order for the parent to decrease expenses and allot
a greater portion of disposable income to the children, a strict reading
of this provision of the Act would penalize the parent by requiring him
or her to report an increase in income equal to the retail price of the
clothing received. This will increase the total amount of the child support
obligation as well as change each parent's proportionate share of that
obligation. This is unfair to the non-domiciliary parent because the child
support obligation increases when the total combined income of both
40. La. R.S. 9:315(4)(a) (Supp. 1990).
41. La. R.S. 9:315(4)(b)-315(4)(c) (Supp. 1990).
42. La. R.S. 9:315(4)(d) (Supp. 1990).
1066 [Vol. 50
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parents rises. The domiciliary parent, while having to report an increased
income, is not obligated to actually spend more real dollars on the
support of the children since that parent's child support obligation is
discharged under the assumption that his or her proportionate share of
the joint obligation is paid. It might be advisable, however, for an
attorney to seek a judicial interpretation of the legislative intent with
regard to non-monetary gifts or to invoke the discretionary power of
the trial court when the issue of non-monetary gifts arises, based on
the inequitable result of the inclusion of gifts in the calculation of the
recipient's gross income or the inequitable increase in the other party's
child support obligation.
b. Inheritance
Another concern is whether an inheritance received by either parent
is to be treated as a gift for the purposes of the child support guidelines
and, furthermore, whether inheritances resulting from testate and intes-
tate successions should be treated differently. Probably, property ac-
quired through intestate successions would be held not to be gifts since
the property would devolve by operation of law. On the other hand,
property acquired through a testate succession probably would be held
to be a gift since such inheritances require the intent of the donor rather
than the simple operation of law. In those situations in which inheritances
would be treated as gifts, it is conceivable that a parent's child support
payments might skyrocket in a year in which he or she comes into an
inheritance or that the recipient of an inheritance might be forced to
liquidate real property received in order to pay an inflated child support
award. A party could certainly invoke the discretion of the trial judge
to determine whether income from inheritance should be included in
the calculation. There may even be a basis for a constitutional challenge
to the inclusion of inheritances in the broad category of gifts if it can
be established that the child support guidelines require divorced couples
to pass an inheritance along to their minor children in the form of
increased child support payments even when the children are already
being maintained at a comfortable financial level. Married couples have
no such obligation to share this new-found wealth with their children
so long as the children are well enough provided for that a claim of
criminal neglect of the family would not lie.
2. Adjustments to Gross Income
Despite the broad definition of "gross income" in the Act, there
are also specific ways in which a parent's gross income figure can be
increased or decreased. Gross income may be increased to what the Act
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refers to simply as "income ' 43 by imputing potential income to an
underemployed parent, or through remarriage, expense sharing, or "other
sources. "
Gross income may also be decreased by amounts the parent pays
because of a preexisting child support or spousal support obligation
owed to someone other than a party to the current proceedings or on
behalf of a child who is not the subject of the current action. This
"adjusted gross income"" is the figure used to determine the amount
of the child support award under the new schedule.
The following subsections analyze these possible modifications to
gross income.
a. Expense-Sharing
Similar to the problem of including gifts in a parent's income is
the inclusion in income of the benefits a parent derives from expense-
sharing. 45 It is unclear whether the legislature intended this provision of
the Act to apply only in cases in which the parents have remarried or
entered into a domestic partnership arrangement short of marriage or
if it should also apply when a parent with limited financial resources
enters into a platonic roommate arrangement" or moves in with family
members in order to decrease household expenses and increase the amount
of money that can be spent directly on the support of the children. A
custodial parent would be penalized by enforcement of this provision
of the Act in an extended family or platonic roommate situation because
the contributions made by his or her roommate to their shared living
expenses may be required to be reported as additions to income. Both
the total amount of the child support obligation and the custodial
parent's proportionate share of the obligation would increase. Similarly,
a non-custodial parent who shares a home with a roommate would likely
see most of the savings thus incurred redirected to a higher child support
award.
Including the benefits of a parent's expense-sharing arrangement in
the child support formula would, in all cases, be beneficial to the children
43. La. R.S. 9:315(6) (Supp. 1990).
44. La. R.S. 9:315(1) (Supp. 1990).
45. La. R.S. 9:315(6)(c) (Supp. 1990).
46. This provision of the Act may have been meant to guarantee the application of
La. Civ. Code arts. 2345 and 2373 and the decision rendered in Finley v. Finley, 305
So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), in the situation in which a parent contracts a second
marriage under a separate property regime or lives in concubinage with a domestic partner
short of marriage. The platonic roommate arrangement should be distinguished from either
legal or "common law" marriage because the responsibilities of the partners to'each other
are so very different, and the inequities cited in the text as resulting from the enforcement
of this provision of the Act are therefore more egregious in the former situation.
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because the parent's gross income would increase and the total child
support obligation would also increase correspondingly. It should be
remembered, however, that all such expense-sharing arrangements are
entered into voluntarily by the parents. Parents may choose to forego
these arrangements once they understand the impact of the expense-
sharing provision of the guidelines and perceive expense-sharing as coun-
terproductive. It seems rather absurd that good faith attempts at reducing
expenses should be discouraged rather than encouraged by the new law
and it is recommended that an amendment to the guidelines deleting
this provision be supported.
b. Income of a New Spouse
Income derived from a parent's remarriage may also be considered
as an addition to the parent's income under the new Act.47 The appellate
courts have previously split on this issue, with some circuits including
the income from the second marriage and other circuits excluding such
funds from the child support calculation. 41 In addition to the same
problem of shared expenses in a non-marital relationship, the decision
of the new spouses to select a community property or separate property
regime (or a modified hybrid of the two) may create further compli-
cations. Whether or not a community property regime exists is a sig-
nificant inquiry in this context because an alimentary obligation legally
imposed on one spouse, such as a child support judgment, is a com-
munity obligation and one-half of what the other spouse earns or acquires
is owned by the obligor.4 9 Stepparents, however, are not personally bound
for such obligations imposed upon their spouses. 0 If the couple is living
under a community regime, any contributions to the support of the
stepchildren made from the salary or other assets of the stepparent which
would be classified as forming a part of the community of acquets and
47. La. R.S. 9:315(6)(c) (Supp. 1990).
48. See Marcus v. Burnett, 282 So. 2d 122, 124 (La. 1973); Finley v. Finley, 305
So. 2d 654, 657 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Culpepper v. Culpepper, 514 So. 2d 701, 703
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Phillips v. Phillips, 319 So. 2d 566, 567 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975). But see Barnes v. Rosen, 359 So. 2d 1133 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 362
So. 2d 1120 (1978), and Alt v. Alt, 433 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
49. La. Civ. Code arts. 2362, 2336.
50. The personal obligation to support minor children arises from the act of entering
into a marriage which produces children (La. Civ. Code art. 227) or from parenthood
(Lewis v. Lewis, 404 So. 2d 1230, 1233 (La. 1981); Pierce v. Pierce, 397 So. 2d 62, 64
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Clement v. Clement, 506 So. 2d 624, 626 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1987); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 480 So. 2d 1031, 1033 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); Lacassagne
v. Lacassagne, 430 So. 2d 818, 820 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983)). The obligation does not
flow from the act of marriage to someone who has previously become a parent.
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gains would not be reimbursed to the stepparent upon termination of
the community. If the spouses are living under a separate property
regime, however, a stepparent who contributes a portion of his or her
earnings or other separate assets to the support of his or her spouse's
children might be entitled to claim reimbursement at the termination of
the marriage based on the principle of negotiorum gestio (Louisiana
Civil Code article 2295) or by analogizing this situation to that dealt
with in Louisiana Civil Code article 2367.1. If the new spouses confect
a matrimonial agreement specifying the proportions in which each would
contribute to the expenses of the marriage," the former spouses (whether
obligor or obligee under the child support judgment) could find them-
selves subject to a child support judgment based on income which is
imputed to them but not actually available for their use. The resulting
increase in the total child support obligation and the shift in the pro-
portionate sharing of that obligation by the natural parents could, de-
pending on the factual situation involved, be inequitable to one or both
of them. The stepparent could also complain that funds which were
supposed to be contributed by the other spouse to the expenses of the
second marriage must now be redirected to meet an increased child
support burden, effectively changing the proportions in which the new
spouses agreed to contribute to the expenses of the marriage. If the
provision in the Act is applied as mandatory, i.e. as requiring a new
spouse's income to be incorporated into the child support formula,
rather than as a possible consideration for increasing a parent's gross
income in isolated situations, the number of couples living under separate
property regimes may increase. This provision might even be interpreted
by prospective spouses as a disincentive to marriage.
c. Spousal Support
Under the guidelines, a parent's gross income includes spousal sup-
port received from a preexisting support obligation. Adjusted gross
income, however, can be reduced by this amount only if the obligation
is owed to a party other than those involved in the current litigation.
Literally interpreted, this provision means that if an order for spousal
support is issued prior to the child support litigation, the obligee will
have to include in income the amount of alimony received and the
obligor will not be able to subtract the amount of alimony paid from
his or her gross income. Thus, the amount of the alimony payment will
be counted twice-once as gross income for the obligor when earnings
are reported and once as gross income for the obligee when the spousal
support amount is added to his or her earnings, thereby inflating the
51. Comment (c) to La. Civ. Code art. 98 indicates that the duty of spouses to
support each other requires only the furnishing of "the necessities of life."
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combined gross income of both parties. For example, if the non-custodial
parent earns $2,000 per month and the custodial parent earns $1,000
per month, the total child support obligation for two children would
be $716 per month, $477 of which would be paid by the non-custodial
parent. If the custodial parent was also awarded a monthly alimony
payment of $500, the child support obligation for their two children
would be based on gross income of $3,500 rather than $3,000. The total
child support obligation would increase from $716 per month to $813,
even though the total amount of money earned by the two parties did
not increase.
Additionally, the proportions in which the child support obligation
is to be borne would also change. In the above example, the non-
custodial parent's disposable income has decreased twenty-five percent,
yet he will be required to make a child support payment only two and
one-half percent smaller ($465 per month rather than $477 had no
alimony been awarded). The custodial parent whose gross income has
increased by fifty percent will not bear a proportionate increase in the
child support obligation, however, because he or she will receive from
the non-custodial parent only twelve dollars less per month than before.
Perhaps the inconsistency in treatment of spousal support in the
two definitions was merely an oversight. Nevertheless, as the guidelines
read now, a clearly inequitable result will arise when there is a pre-
existing alimony judgment, thus requiring a routine petition for deviation
from the application of the guidelines. 2
An additional problem would arise if the child support issue were
decided prior to the alimony issue. In that case, it would be necessary
to decide whether the subsequent issuance of an alimony order would
constitute a change in circumstances necessitating modification 53 of the
child support order. Absent amendment of the new legislation, practi-
tioners would be well advised to seek judgment on the spousal support
issue in advance of resolution of the child support issue.
d. Potential Income
If a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, the guide-
lines provide that his or her gross income will be increased, solely for
purposes of calculating the support amount, to the level of his or her
potential earning capacity. 54 The key word in this provision is "vol-
52. See infra text, Deviation From the Guidelines, pp. 1083-87.
53. La. R.S. 9:311.A (Supp. 1990) provides that: "An award for support shall not
be reduced or increased unless the party seeking the reduction or increase shows a change
in circumstances of one of the parties between the time of the previous award and the
time of the motion for modification of the award."
54. La. R.S. 9:315.9 (Supp. 1990).
1990] 1071
2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
untarily," which is consistent with pre-guidelines jurisprudence that held
that "a parent's practical ability to pay [child support] does not allow
that parent to avoid his share of the obligation when the inability arises
from his own neglect or failure.""
A worker who is laid off or can only find employment at wages
lower than his or her potential should not be penalized by having
additional income imputed to him or her. The clear intent of the
legislature in enacting this provision was to punish the malingerer who
might attempt to evade his or her child support obligation by avoiding
full employment. This is evident from the amendment 6 that removes
the presumption found in the child support guidelines of some states5 7
that all full-time employment is full employment.
The new guidelines also provide that a parent caring for a child of
the parties under the age of five is exempt from the imputation of
potential income. It seems that the intent is that mothers of young
children will not be forced into the job market before their children
begin to attend school, but that they are encouraged to seek employment
once their children reach school age.5
Despite the logical reasons for the legislature's inclusion of this
provision in the guidelines, there are situations in which the imputation
of additional income to a parent who has voluntarily changed to a lower
paying position would be extremely inequitable. For instance, an attorney
may choose to work as a law librarian or a law professor rather than
as a practitioner in a large law firm. Because the attorney has made a
choice to utilize his or her legal training in a career with likely lower
55. McManus v. McManus, 528 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
533 So. 2d 23 (1988). See also Moseley v. Moseley, 216 So. 2d 852, 854 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1968) (stating that "[a] father's obligation to support his wife and child are paramount
to his right of voluntary retirement").
56. In the original and engrossed versions of House Bill No. 18 (which in the legislative
process ultimately became the Act) section 315(6)(b) stated that "[a] party shall not be
deemed underemployed if gainfully employed on a full-time basis." H.R. 18, 15th La.
Leg., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (1989). A House floor amendment proposed by Representative
Haik was adopted and the pertinent provision of the enrolled bill reads as follows: "A
party shall not be deemed voluntarily unemployed or underemployed if he or she is
absolutely unemployable or incapable of being employed, or if the unemployment or
underemployment results through no fault or neglect of the party." House Floor Amend-
ments, Proposed by Representative Haik of the Louisiana Legislature to Engrossed H.R.
18, 15th La. Leg., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (1989).
57. For a criticism of the retention of this presumption in Colorado, see Harhai,
Key Issues in the Colorado Child Support Guidelines, 16 Colo. Law. 51, 52 (1987).
58. Guidelines for Determination of Child Support: Hearings on House Bill No. 18
Before the Committee on Civil Law and Procedure for the Louisiana House of Repre-
sentatives, 2d Extraordinary Sess. (1989) (tape recording). An additional exemption from
the operation of this provision occurs when a parent is physically or mentally incapacitated.
La. R.S. 9:315.9 (Supp. 1990).
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pay does not necessarily mean that he or she is underemployed. Consider
the case of the powerful senior partner in a large law firm who decides
that he or she can no longer handle the stress that accompanies the
higher income and takes a corporate position at a much lower salary.
While this attorney's income will certainly decrease, the change in careers
might add several years to his or her life, years during which child
support payments will continue but would otherwise have ceased. It
seems inequitable that this change be penalized.
Another example of an inequitable application of the potential in-
come provision involves the case of a custodial parent who changes
careers in order to accommodate the children's school schedules. For
instance, if a custodial parent is a degreed social worker or psychologist
who could earn substantially more in a private practice, but decides
instead to take a job with his or her local school system in order that
his or her work hours closely approximate the children's school hours,
imputing potential income achieves an inequitable result. The intent of
the parent may have been to save the costs of day care or to provide
an opportunity for spending more quality time with the children. Yet,
the same law that supported the parent's decision to stay home with
the pre-school age children will now penalize the parent for attempting
to accommodate his or her schedule with that of the children, simply
because they are now of school age.
This provision is also inequitable when a parent seeks additional
education to guarantee a higher income and standard of living for himself
or herself and his or her children in the future. For example, a mother
with only a high school diploma may decide to seek a college degree
once her children have all begun school and she now has more free
time; or, a father holding a college degree may wish to resign from his
position and temporarily work part-time while seeking a second degree
that has a greater potential of higher earnings. In these cases, whether
the parent involved is the custodial or non-custodial parent, the law
works against the best interest of both the parent and the children by
not looking beyond the short-term goal of awarding the largest possible
child support check at that time.
This part of the statute could be improved by mandating an inquiry
into the intent of the parent who has voluntarily changed his or her
career path. A parent found to be in bad faith would be treated as
though he or she were earning at his or her potential income level while
a parent determined to be in good faith in view of the long term best
interest of the children involved would make child support contributions
only in accordance with his or her actual, though lower, gross income.
In the absence of an amendment, parents faced with situations similar
to those described above will, of necessity, be forced to seek judicial




Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the section of the Act
pertaining to parents who are voluntarily unemployed or underemployed
is its final sentence, which reads:
The amount of the basic child support obligation obtained by
use of this Section shall not exceed that amount which the party
paying support would have owed had no determination of the
other party's earning income potential been made.5 9
It is possible that the purpose of this amendment was to affect the
proportionate shares of child support to be borne respectively by the
former spouses in situations in which potential income is imputed to
one of them while leaving undisturbed the total child support obligation
as determined in accordance with their actual gross income figures.
Unfortunately, the amendment did not clearly accomplish this result.
The failure to draft this provision unambiguously and to set forth their
true intention may have caused the sponsors of the amendment to render
the entire section meaningless rather than improving it.
The amendment also indicates that the legislature contemplated only
the situation in which income may be imputed to the obligee parent
and not that in which income may be imputed to the obligor parent.
This either ignores the possibility of imputing potential earnings to both
custodial and non-custodial parents or deliberately creates a dual ap-
proach depending upon whether it is the obligor spouse or the obligee
spouse to whom potential income is imputed. If the intent of the
legislature was to handle the two situations differently, custodial and
non-custodial parents would then be treated differently under the Act,
perhaps raising the specter of a constitutional challenge on equal pro-
tection grounds.
Assuming that a dual approach was intended, if it is the obligor
parent to whom potential income is being imputed, then his or her
larger income figure is entered into the equation as though it were his
or her actual gross income and the formula is completed as in any
other scenario. If it is the obligee parent to whom potential income is
being imputed, however, then the inflated income figure cannot be used
to increase the total amount of the basic child support obligation above
the amount that the obligor would have owed had the other parent's
income not been inflated. This renders the provision nonsensical because
in each case in which the guidelines are utilized the basic child support
59. La. R.S. 9:315.9 (Supp. 1990). This sentence became a part of the Act as a
result of an amendment to the originally proposed bill. See Senate Committee Amendments,
Proposed by Judiciary Committee A for the Louisiana Senate to Reengrossed House Bill
No. 18, 2d Extraordinary Sess. (1989).
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obligation (the total amount owed by both parents based on their total
income) must exceed the amount that one of the parties owes. The basic
child support obligation is equal to the total of the amount that the
two parties owe to the children. Therefore, in every case in which
potential income is imputed to the obligee, a literal application of this
provision would reduce the basic child support obligation to the amount
that the obligor would have been obligated to pay to the custodial parent
had no potential income been imputed. Presumably, that amount will
be apportioned between the parents in accordance with their gross in-
comes. Rather than insuring that the child derives a benefit from the
full earning potential of his or her parents, this means that the amount
of support owed by the fully employed non-custodial parent is decreased
because the custodial parent is underemployed. It hardly seems reasonable
that the legislature would have withheld support money from a child
in order to encourage a parent to seek full employment. It is suggested
that this section of the Act be amended to correct this obvious inequity.
In the meantime, trial attorneys would be advised to seek judicial de-
viation from this provision because its application is not in the best
interest of the children involved.
B. Additions to the Basic Child Support Obligation
Once the basic child support obligation has been determined, the
Act provides that four categories of expenses can then be added to the
obligation figure prior to the apportionment of the total support amount
to the parents. Despite the general policy of the Act that the child
support obligation be satisfied only through monetary payments to the
custodial parent, it is permissible for the court to order payments to
be made directly to the providers of these four categories of expenses. 60
These four additional items are child care costs, health insurance prem-
iums, extraordinary medical expenses, and other extraordinary expenses.
1. Child Care Costs
The Act mandates that net child care costs, defined as "the rea-
sonable costs of child care incurred by a party due to employment or
job search, minus the value of the federal income tax credit for child
care," '6' be added to the basic child support obligation. 62 Determining
what is "reasonable" will be subject to judicial interpretation and should
prevent misuse of this provision by one parent acting without the consent
of the other in obtaining child care services. It is important to note
60. La. R.S. 9:315.8.D (Supp. 1990).
61. La. R.S. 9:315(7) (Supp. 1990).
62. La. R.S. 9:315.3 (Supp. 1990).
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that while this section limits allowable child care costs to those incurred
for employment purposes, it does not limit child care costs to those
incurred by the domiciliary parent. If, for example, the need arises for
the non-domiciliary parent to work overtime during weekend visitation,
child care expenses thus incurred should be added to the basic child
support obligation and shared by the parents.
An obvious area of concern not addressed by the Act is the need
for child care when a parent seeks additional schooling. It would be to
the benefit of all parties involved if a custodial parent, in a good faith
effort to achieve a better education and correspondingly enhance his or
her employability, were allowed to add to the basic child support ob-
ligation the reasonable cost of child care incurred to facilitate his or
her further education. Otherwise, the high cost of child care might be
perceived as a disincentive to the parent's goal of providing a better
standard of living, a result the Act should not be perceived as fostering.
Perhaps an amendment to the Act is in order to allow child care expenses
for educational, as well as work-related, purposes. Careful drafting of
the amendment to preserve the stipulation that such expenses be rea-
sonable and to include an inquiry into the good faith intent of the
student to pursue employment after schooling has been completed would
be simple ways to prevent misuse of the provision.
2. Health Insurance Premiums
The Act also makes it mandatory that the cost of health insurance
premiums for the child be added to the basic child support obligation. 63
Health insurance premiums are defined in detail in the Act6 and the
amount to be added to the child support figure is limited to the actual
out-of-pocket cost to the parent of the child's proportionate share of
the total health insurance premium should the child be insured under
a policy providing family coverage. This provision does not mean that
health insurance must be purchased for each child, nor does it mean
that the obligor parent has the sole responsibility for providing health
insurance coverage for the child. The clear intent was simply to recognize
that health insurance coverage for children was not contemplated in the
confection of the guideline's support schedule and to force the parents
to share the cost of their children's health insurance premiums.
3. Extraordinary Medical Expenses
Extraordinary medical expenses may be added to the basic child
support obligation only upon order of the court or agreement of the
63. La. R.S. 9:315.4 (Supp. 1990).
64. La. R.S. 9:315(5) (Supp. 1990).
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parties.6 5 Because such expenses are defined in the Act as including not
only amounts in excess of $100 per illness not reimbursed by health
insurance, but also special medical procedures such as orthodontia,
asthma treatments, physical therapy, and psychological consultation,66
the requirement of joint parental consent or court order was necessary
to assure that the non-domiciliary parent was required to share only
the cost of reasonable medical expenses. An additional statutory safe-
guard is that professional counseling or psychiatric therapy may be
considered as legitimate extraordinary medical expenses only if designed
to treat "diagnosed mental disorders. ' '67 This. language might require
expert clarification in the future.
4. Other Extraordinary Expenses
Similarly, in the interest of assuring reasonableness, agreement of
the parties or order of the court is necessary before expenses incurred
in transporting a child from one parent to the other or for. special or
private schooling may be added to the basic child support obligation.
6 1
An additional requirement is placed upon the type of special or private
schooling expense that can be added to the support calculation in that
there must be a demonstration that the special school is necessary to
meet the particular educational needs of the child. Judicial discretion
and the skillful advocacy of the parents' attorneys will be crucial factors
in obtaining approval for the addition of either of these two types of
expenses to the basic child support obligation.
C. Deductions from the Basic Child Support Obligation-Income of
the Child
The only method of decreasing the basic child support obligation
is by applying the child's income to the amount determined to be proper
for his or her support. This adjustment is permitted under the Act with
the limitation that income earned by the child while a full-time student
cannot be used for this purpose. 69 Additionally, the use of the child's
funds for his or her own support is a discretionary matter requiring
concurrence of the trial judge.7 0
D. The Schedule of Basic Child Support Obligations
While the income shares model used as the foundation for the
Louisiana child support guidelines is philosophically aligned with pre-
65. La. R.S. 9:315.5 (Supp. 1990).
66. La. R.S. 9:315(3) (Supp. 1990). This list is illustrative rather than exclusive.
67. La. R.S. 9:315(3) (Supp. 1990).
68. La. R.S. 9:315.6 (Supp. 1990).




guidelines policy -and jurisprudence, no information is provided in the
text of the guidelines as to the origin of the specific numbers that appear
on the numerical schedule incorporated into the Act or the philosophical
or political agenda upon which those numbers were based. 7' The briefing
manuals prepared for use by the Louisiana legislature72 do, however,
provide some clues as to the factors relied upon in deriving the actual
numbers that comprise the schedule. 73 It is advised, however, that the
figures that appear on the schedule be reviewed by expert researchers
when the guidelines are evaluated in 1991.74
For example, a self support reserve for the benefit of the obligor
parent was woven into the schedule. The reserve is $498 per month,
the 1989 federal poverty standard for one person. 75 This reserve was
designed to protect the obligor parent's interest in being able to meet
a child support obligation and still support himself or herself at a level
not falling below the federal poverty line. This concept was borrowed
from the child support formula used in Delaware. 76
The schedule also incorporates the concept that the percentage of
parental income designated for the support of minor children should
not remain static at all income levels but should decrease as income
increases. Similarly, the support figures for one child are not simply
doubled to derive the support figure for two children, reflecting another
policy decision not addressed in the text of the guidelines.
Perhaps most significantly, the legislation tells us that the gross
income of the parents is to be used as the primary source from which
the basic child support obligation is to be calculated. Proponents have
71. The schedule is found at La. R.S. 9:315.14 (Supp. 1990). The numbers were
compiled by Mr. Robert G. Williams, president of Policy Studies, Inc. in Denver, Colorado,
a consultant hired by the state to assist in the confection of the guidelines. Mr. Williams
has published widely on the subject of child support guidelines. See, e.g., Williams,
Guidelines, supra note 3; Williams, Deficiencies, supra note 4; Williams, Child Support
and the Costs of Raising Children: Using Formulas to Set Adequate Awards, Juv. &
Fam. Ct. J., Fall 1985, at 41. He has assisted several other states, including Colorado,
Maryland and Wyoming, in the development of child support guidelines. Letter from
Robert G. Williams to Jerry G. Jones, Attorney, Committee on Civil Law and Procedure,
La. House of Representatives (March 13, 1989) (discussing the draft statute for imple-
menting child support guidelines in Louisiana) [hereinafter Williams-Jones Letter]. Mr.
Williams has also assisted the federal government in the creation of child support policy
and procedures. See, e.g., Williams, Guidelines, supra note 3, at 282 n.1; Williams,
Deficiencies, supra note 4, at 5 ed.n.
72. Williams-Jones Letter, supra note 71; Briefing Material 1, supra note 24; Briefing
Material 2, supra note 24.
73. See supra note 24 for additional discussion of this topic.
74. La. R.S. 9:315.12 (Supp. 1990) requires legislative review of the guidelines not
less than once every four years, with the initial review scheduled for 1991.
75. Williams-Jones Letter, supra note 71.
76. See, e.g., Williams, Guidelines, supra note 3, at 295; Thompson & Paikin, supra
note 39, at 36.
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suggested this is preferable to relying upon net income figures because
of the possibility that obligor parents seeking to avoid child support
payments may manipulate their federal withholding levels and other
variables in order to portray an unrealistic net income figure as compared
with their actual gross income.7 7 This problem was not cured in the
confection of the Louisiana child support schedule. Instead, net income
figures were arbitrarily manipulated to arrive at the gross income figures
correlated, on the schedule, with "proper" child support amounts as
explained below.
The Act requires each parent to provide financial information to
the court and to the other parent. 78 It further requires that the gross
income of each parent be calculated and that their combined total gross
income be determined. Only then is the schedule of basic child support
obligations consulted. Based on the adjusted total gross income of the
parents and the number of children they have, the basic child support
obligation is read from the schedule. While the numbers used for the
parents' income throughout the formula are gross income figures, the
corresponding figures for child support shown on the schedule have
been derived by converting gross income figures to net income figures.
This result was accomplished by applying 1988 federal tax rates, 1984
Louisiana tax rates, allowing for two standard deductions at the federal
level and one at the state level, then adjusting the numbers for earned
income tax credit and Social Security deductions, and finally converting
the numbers back to gross income figures. 79 It is inconceivable that the
application of these variables, for the presumed purpose of decreasing
the administrative inconvenience of determining net income on a case-
by-case basis, actually serves the goal of equity. The schedule of support
amounts was drafted without providing flexibility for changes in tax
rates, different numbers of deductions, or the possibility of sheltered
income. While the guidelines must be reviewed at least every four years
in order to be in compliance with the federal mandate that led to their
adoption, 80 it is not expressed in the Louisiana act whether the same
factors used to select the numbers appearing on the schedule will be
among the items so reviewed. It is hoped that such is the case.
E. Joint Custody
While joint custody is presumed to be in the best interest of the
child in Louisiana, 81 the child support guidelines make very little allow-
77. See, e.g., Elrod, supra note 35, at 129.
78. La. R.S. 9:315.2.A (Supp. 1990).
79. Williams-Jones Letter, supra note 71.
80. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485 § 103, 102 Stat. 2343, 2346
(1988).
81. La. Civ. Code art. 146.
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ance for the situation in which physical custody of a child is shared by
the parents. When child support guidelines were introduced in the regular
1989 legislative session, specific provisions detailing the way in which
joint custody was to be handled were included.8 2 These provisions were
perceived as being difficult to understand and equally difficult to apply;
thus, they were deleted from the bill that was ultimately passed. Ad-
ditional reasons for this deletion were to avoid having two statutory
definitions of joint custody, to prevent posturing by parents who might
feign a desire for custody of their children in order to take advantage
of the joint custody provisions of the guidelines, and to discourage
manipulation of both the child custody laws and the operation of the
child support guidelines by parents seeking to achieve adjustments in
the amount of the child support award. The new legislation leaves the
factoring of joint custody into the child support equation to the discretion
of the trial court. The Act states simply that:
In cases of joint custody, the court may consider the period of
time spent by the child with the nondomiciliary party as a basis
for adjustment to the amount of child support to be paid during
that period of time. The court may include in such consideration
the continuing expenses of the domiciliary party.83
This is an instance in which the attorneys representing the parents should
appeal to the judge hearing the case to deviate from the letter of the
guidelines in order to reach a result that is equitable to both parents
and that is also in the best interest of the child.
F. Modification of a Child Support Award
1. Change of Circumstances
There is no provision in the guidelines explaining the bases upon
which a parent can seek modification of a child support award. En-
actment of the new guidelines, however, is not to be deemed a "change
in circumstances ' 84 allowing either party an opportunity to petition the
court for modification of an established child support award.85 This
82. See H.R. 1383, 15th La. Leg., Regular Sess. (1989). The bill redefined "joint
physical custody" for the purposes of the child support guidelines and set forth separate
procedures to be followed in the case of sole custody and joint physical custody arrange-
ments.
83. La. R.S. 9:315.8.E (Supp. 1990).
84. La. R.S. 9:311.A (Supp. 1990) provides that: "An award for support shall not
be reduced or increased unless the party seeking the reduction or increase shows a change
in circumstances of one of the parties between the time of the previous award and the
time of the motion for modification of the award."
85. La. R.S. 9:315.11 (Supp. 1990).
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provision thus allays the fears of some critics of the guidelines that the
new legislation would multiply the amount of child support litigation.
Because there is no express standard for modification provided in the
guidelines, it appears that it will still be necessary, as under the pre-
guidelines rules, that a party demonstrate a change in circumstances
before seeking modification of an existing child support judgment. The
jurisprudential standards requiring more than a mere change in
circumstance 6 and, usually, a substantial change in circumstances," must
still be met.
Some states have dealt with the problem of subsequent modification
trials by allowing parties to request modification every two years without
showing a change in circumstances88 or by requiring that the parents
exchange financial information every few years .in order that they can
determine whether or not a modification is necessary.8 9 Analysts have
suggested alternative procedures for updating awards, such as making
routine appearances before administrative review panels or mediators, 9°
that are not as burdensome to parents as litigation, the traditional method
utilized for award modification. Such procedures could easily be built
into the guidelines 9' so that they are known and understood by all parties
involved and it is suggested that the Louisiana guidelines would benefit
from such an amendment.
2. In Globo Awards
Prior to the enactment of the guidelines, child support judgments
in Louisiana were either in the form of a "per child" award or an "in
globo" award. The significant difference between the two was that a
"per child" award was automatically reduced proportionately as the
children reached the age of majority92 while an "in globo" award could
be reduced only upon petition of the court, even when one of the
children reached majority. 93 Under the guidelines, all child support awards
in Louisiana are "in globo" awards.
Two basic theories underlying the design of the schedule of basic
child support obligations are that certain household expenses considered
86. Reavill v. Reavill, 370 So. 2d 175, 177 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
87. See, e.g., Stagg v. Stagg, 436 So. 2d 1202, 1205 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
442 So. 2d 453 (1983); Mortillaro v. Mortillaro, 507 So. 2d 854, 855 (La. App. 5th Cir.),
writ denied, 508 So. 2d 825 (1987).
88. Brackney, supra note 10, at 212 (Michigan).
89. Mangum, Arizona: New Child Support Guidelines, Ariz. B.J., Dec./Jan. 1988,
at 10 (Arizona).
90. Brackney, supra note 10, at 213.
91. Id.
92. La. R.S. 9:309.A.
93. La. R.S. 9:309.B.
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in the cost of a child's support cannot simply be divided by the number
of children in the home and thus equitably stated94 and that a smaller
percentage of total income is spent on each child as a result of the
economies of scale as the number of children in a family increases. 95
However, because the schedule already contains numbers for one through
six or more children at each income level considered, a complicated
recalculation would not be necessary to determine the proper child
support award when the number of children subject to the award changes.
A simple amendment to the guidelines allowing the basic child support
obligation to be reduced to the next lower category on the schedule
each time a minor child reaches majority would eliminate the necessity
of going back to court for a routine modification as each child turns
eighteen.
G. Stipulations by the Parties
Should the parents negotiate a stipulation as to the amount of child
support each of them will provide to their minor children, the court
has the discretion to review the mutual agreement but is under no
requirement to do so.9 If reviewed, a stipulation must be found adequate
in light of the child support guidelines but there is no requirement that
information pertaining to the income of the parents be reviewed. It
hardly seems possible that the adequacy of an award under a system
correlating the award amounts directly to income can be assessed without
examining information regarding the income of the parties. Nor does
it seem plausible that a system designed to meet the goals of consistency
and adequacy of child support awards would provide for unreviewed
stipulations of the parties. That both of these are specifically permitted
under the new guidelines illustrates the extent of judicial discretion
retained under the new legislation.
Proponents of child support guidelines have suggested that an ad-
vantage to employing formulas and schedules for the determination of
child support awards is that such a system increases the objectivity of
the process by which child support awards are determined and results
in a correspondingly higher number of out of court settlements of child
support disputes. 97 Parents and children would be spared the trauma of
94. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Weaver, New Child
Support Guideline Adopted, Fam. L. Newsl., Sept. 1986, at 1665 [hereinafter Weaver);
Williams, Guidelines, supra note 3, at 287.
95. Norton, The Challenge of Mandatory Child Support Schedules, Cal. Law., Oct.
1985, at 59, 60.
96. La. R.S. 9:315.1.D (Supp. 1990).
97. See, e.g., Powers, Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines of 1988, 30 B.C.L.
Rev. 644, 652 (1989); Williams, Guidelines, supra note 3, at 286; Goldfarb, supra note
2, at 326.
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court appearances; funds that would otherwise have gone to pay the
costs of litigation could be redirected to cover the costs of supporting
the children; congested court calendars would be relieved; and the ad-
equacy and consistency of the awards so determined would be increased.
Anyone-judges, attorneys, the litigants themselves-could input the ap-
propriate numbers into the formula, consult, a table, and derive the
presumptively correct child support award figure. Under Louisiana's new
guidelines, however, so many variables have been written into the formula
and so much discretion has been left in the hands of the judges that
the goal of increasing out of court settlements will not likely occur
because the guidelines do not provide the certainty of result required
for such a by-product. It is just as plausible to predict that the legislation
will, in fact, decrease the number of stipulated support decrees and
increase the amount of child support litigation heard in Louisiana court-
rooms because there are so many issues raised by the guidelines legislation
that are left to the discretion of the court. The certainty required to
encourage voluntary compliance with the guidelines would exist if it
were necessary that stipulated settlements be reviewed by a judge and
that they conform to the new guidelines. As the legislation now reads,
however, the strategy for attorneys representing clients in the inherently
adversarial atmosphere of child support disputes will be to use the
discretionary features and the permissible variables addressed in the
legislation to the advantage of the individual client. The typical strategy
may be to challenge the application of the support calculation and
numbers on the schedule in each particular set of circumstances rather
than simply complying with the guidelines.
H. Deviation From the Guidelines
Like most other states, Louisiana has historically permitted its judges
a great deal of discretion in setting the amounts of child support awards. 9
Parents relied on the ability of their attorneys to present most favorably
the circumstances of their case. The amount of support determined was
98. "In most states, the judge's broad discretion is governed by only two general
considerations-the needs of the child and the noncustodial parent's ability to pay." Elrod,
supra note 35, at 107. For Louisiana decisions regarding the extent of judicial discretion
permitted in fixing the amount of child support awards, see, e.g., Ducote v. Ducote, 339
So. 2d 835, 839 (La. 1976) (considerable discretion); Nelms v. Nelms, 413 So. 2d 1341,
1342 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 415 So. 2d 944 (1982) (wide discretion); Jones
v.Jones, 351 So. 2d 825, 826 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) (discretion); Sims v. Sims, 457
So. 2d 163, 164 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984) (wide discretion); Dickinson v. Dickinson, 461
So. 2d 1184, 1186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 465 So. 2d 736 (1985) (much
discretion); Ducree v. Thomas, 415 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) (considerable




not likely to be changed on appeal because the standard for judicial
review in the matter of child support determinations requires a showing
of abuse of discretion by the trial judge.99
Although providing for the best interest of the child is always the
ideal sought by child support judgments, the children themselves are
never represented in child custody or child support litigation' °° Instead,
the true focus of the proceedings is often subverted by the skillful
advocacy of the parents' attorneys, locked in an emotionally-charged
and sometimes hostile lawsuit.
Proponents of child support guidelines contend that the removal of
judicial discretion better protects the interest of children by assuring
adequate awards and better protects the interest of parents by assuring
that consistent awards are issued.'0' In practice, however, the newly
enacted Louisiana guidelines may not actually accomplish those goals
because our judges will retain a great deal of discretion.
While it establishes a rebuttable presumption that the amount of
child support determined through the use of the guidelines is the proper
amount to be awarded, 02 the Act also expressly preserves the court's
right to deviate from the guidelines. 03 In stating that "[tihe court may
deviate from the guidelines set forth in this Part,"' 4 judges are given
the authority not only to change the award figure derived by employing
the formula described in the legislation (a deviation only from the
"Schedule for support" contained in Section 315.13) but also authority
to change or to disregard any or all of the Act's other provisions (since
the entirety of the legislation is entitled "Guidelines for Determination
of Child Support"). The only limits placed on judicial deviation are
the requirements that the judge find that the use of the guidelines
achieved a result that was either not in the best interest of the child
or inequitable to the parties and that he give an explanation of the
reasons for the deviation in the trial record. 05 The use of the "best
interest of the child" and "inequitable to the parties" standards preserves
additional judicial latitude because a determination that either of these
99. See, e.g., Nelms v. Nelms, 413 So. 2d 1341, 1342 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 415 So. 2d 944 (1982); Jones v.Jones, 351 So. 2d 825, 826 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1977); Sims v. Sims, 457 So. 2d 163, 164 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Dickinson v. Dickinson,
461 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 465 So. 2d 736 (1985);
Ducree v. Thomas, 415 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Trinchard v. Trinchard,
446 So. 2d 400, 401 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
100. Smith and Laramore, Massachusetts' Child Support Guidelines: A Model for
Development 23 (1986) (unpublished paper); Williams, Guidelines, supra note 3, at 313.
101. See, e.g., Brackney, supra note 10, at 199-200.
102. La. R.S. 9:315.1.A (Supp. 1990).
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standards has been satisfied requires a strictly subjective evaluation on
the part of the trial court.
More particularly, the Act sets forth an illustrative list of five factors
that may be considered by the court in making a decision to deviate
from the guidelines.
First, a combined adjusted gross income lower or higher than that
shown on the support schedule allows the judge to set the support
amount based solely on the facts of the case. The only limit to this
discretion is that when a higher income figure is being considered the
court must set an award at least as large as the highest one shown on
the schedule. 106 Some states have established a minimum award for those
situations where the obligor's income is lower than the minimum amount
on the state's schedule. For example, Colorado obligors who earn less
than $500 per month are required to pay between $20 and $50 per
month in child support. This is thought to be responsive to the public
policy that all parents should pay at least some minimal amount toward
the support of their children.'0 7 Louisiana chose to leave both high-end
and low-end determinations to the trial court's discretion.
A judge may also deviate from the guidelines when a party has a
legal obligation to support a dependent living in that party's household
but who is not involved in the current action. 0 8 This provision might
pertain to a spouse or children from a subsequent marriage, children
from a former marriage, or elderly parents. It might also include a
child of the marriage between the present litigants who, through a split
custody arrangement, 1°9 is in the custody of the non-custodial spouse in
the current action. While the Act provides authority for deviation with
regard to these dependents, it could certainly be argued, in the case
where the additional dependents are minor children, that the schedule
of presumptively proper support amounts should be used to arrive at
an allocation of the parents' income to all of the children involved.
The next specific consideration for deviation is an extraordinary
medical expense of either a party or a dependent of a party that has
not already been factored into the support calculations. ' 10 Extraordinary
medical expenses are defined as those costing $100 above insurance
policy reimbursement for a single illness or those required by special
medical treatments such as orthodontia or physical therapy."' The judge's
106. La. R.S. 9:315.1.C(1) (Supp. 1990).
107. Weaver, supra note 94, at 1665.
108. La. R.S. 9:315.1.C(2) (Supp. 1990).
109. A split custody arrangement is that in which each of the parents has legal custody
of at least one of the children of their marriage.
110. La. R.S. 9:315.1.C(3) (Supp. 1990).
111. La. R.S. 9:315(3) (Supp. 1990).
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discretion is unlimited in determining when the existence of such medical
expenses warrants a deviation from the child support guidelines.
The existence of an extraordinary community debt of the parties is
also a factor that may be considered by the judge in making the decision
to deviate from the guidelines.11 2 The term "extraordinary" is unfor-
tunately not defined in the Act.
One critic of the new guidelines points out that a judgment of
separation or divorce generally does not terminate the responsibility of
the couple to their pre-existing financial obligations and questions whether
house notes, car notes, and credit card payments might be considered
extraordinary debts of the community." 3 Practitioners will likely urge
that house notes and similar community debts do fall into the category
of extraordinary community debts.
Finally, the Act specifically permits a judge to consider deviating
from the guidelines should the establishment of a temporary support
order be necessary for the interim period between the actual filing for
the order and the hearing on the matter." 4 The amount of such a
temporary order is to be determined at the discretion of the trial court.
This provision was necessitated by the inherent delays in the judicial
system and the fact that a child's financial needs do not yield to such
considerations. 5
It should be remembered that the Act does not create an irrefutable
method of determining child support awards. So much judicial discretion
has been retained that it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a
party will not have the opportunity to urge that the court deviate from
at least one of the provisions incorporated in the guidelines.
It is impossible to predict the manner in which the state's judiciary
will use the guidelines. An extreme reaction may be to view the guidelines
as mere suggestions that can be easily circumvented. At the other ex-
treme, the guidelines may be perceived as legislative mandates that must
be adhered to with strict precision. Although leaving too much discretion
in the judge's hands undermines the goals of consistency and certainty
that were inherently sought in the decision to implement child support
guidelines,"16 rigid application of the guidelines in the absence of any
judicial discretion would also be inequitable. Our courts have tradition-
ally rejected the notion that a mathematical formula can weigh the
innumerable variables that must be factored into a decision as important
112. La. R.S. 9:315.1.C(4) (Supp. 1990).
113. Holliday, Child Support Guidelines: Is the New Law the Answer? Louisiana
Woman, Sept. 1989, at 14.
114. La. R.S. 9:315.1.C(5) (Supp. 1990).
115. Guidelines for Determination of Child Support: Hearings on House Bill No. 18
Before the Committee on Civil Law and Procedure for the Louisiana House of Repre-
sentatives, 2d Extraordinary Sess. (1989) (tape recording).
116. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 336.
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as the apportionment of funds for the support of minor children." 7 We
can, therefore, expect several appellate court decisions relating to the
interpretation of the discretionary provisions of the Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal mandate for the implementation of child support guide-
lines afforded the Louisiana legislature a unique opportunity to revise
the system traditionally used for the determination of child support
awards and to attempt to achieve the goals of adequacy and consistency
in the setting of those awards. The newly enacted guidelines embrace,
in large part, the state's express public policies regarding family support
obligations and were designed to provide for the best interest of the
children involved while also treating parents equitably.
A likely impact of the legislation will be litigation regarding the
extent of the latitude to be afforded trial courts under the new guidelines
and the specific instances in which deviation from the guidelines will
be permitted. It is likely that there will be a continuing interest in
amendment of the guidelines to include topics not covered in the initial
legislation and to modify specific provisions of the legislation once the
legal community has had a chance to observe the actual effects of the
Act on their clients. It is also anticipated that there will be a decrease
in the number of negotiated settlements of child support disputes because
too much judicial discretion was preserved under the new system. An
increase in the number of child custody battles may also result when
individual litigants realize that custody can be a self-serving arrangement
when child support awards are large and only the non-domiciliary parent
is required to satisfy the obligation with actual cash payments.
It is hoped that the needs of our state's children will always be the
primary focus of child support disputes and that the guidelines discussed
in this article will be used by our judges to mitigate the certain and
sometimes catastrophic economic effects of divorce by enabling them to
establish awards that are tailored to the best interest of the children
but are also equitable to the parents.
Sue Nations
Postscript
A copy of the manuscript of this article was delivered to Repre-
sentative Allen Bradley, the author of the bill containing child support
117. See, e.g., Sims v. Sims, 457 So. 2d 163, 164 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Stepp v.
Stepp, 442 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Fall v. Fontenot, 307 So. 2d
779, 781 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Clynes v. Clynes, 450 So. 2d 372, 375 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1983); Simon v. Simon, 450 So. 2d 755, 757 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
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guidelines enacted in 1989. He discussed the content with other legislators
and several suggestions of the author of the article were included in
legislation introduced during the 1990 Legislative Session.
House Bill No. 1006 by Representative Randy Roach amended La.
R.S. 9:315(4)(a), (d) (Supp. 1990) to delete "gifts" and "prizes" from
the definition of "gross income." The bill passed both Houses of the
Legislature and was signed by the Governor. (1990 La. Acts No. 117).
In addition to amending the definition of "gross income" to exclude
the two mentioned phrases, the definition now also excludes "per diem
allowances." Furthermore, the Act provides that a specific cause jus-
tifying a deviation from the guideline amount may include "(b) per-
manent or temporary total disability of a spouse to the extent such
disability diminishes his present and future earning capacity, his need
to save adequately for uninsurable future medical costs, and other ad-
ditional costs associated with such disability, such as transportation and
mobility costs, medical expenses, and higher insurance premiums." (La.
R.S. 9:315.1(C)(6)).
